Kaplan Nuggets III: 1985-1989

 

 

"The Austrians foolishly doubled a lay-down slam, for no apparent reason except, perhaps, the a priori unlikelihood of one side’s taking 12 tricks."

"Knockout in Seattle" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 2/1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Isn’t it strange how little leeway modern responders give openers, considering what they themselves open?

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

On Board 1 of all matches, the North player picked up, as dealer, neither side vulnerable,

9 5 / K Q 8 7 5 3 2 / Q 7 4 / K

Everyone was no doubt aware of the hand’s glaring flaws for preemptive action, the weak heart spots, the minor-suit honors that looked so much better for defense than offense. But this was the first board -what a chance to push the enemy around, setting the tone for the whole match! Who could resist such temptation? [Only two of the eight] Partner displayed the usual garbage

K872/10/AJ103/J873

and the result was most often 500 (...) The opponents, with only 21 HCP and no great fit, might not get above the one level left to their own devices, just as well since this is about what they could make.

"Knockout in Seattle, II" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 3/1985, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Overcall, fit-showing jump by partner, minimum-showing rebid by advancer, all pass]

What an intelligent way to miss an easy vulnerable game!

Ibid, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Vul. against Nonvul, South opens 1S, West preempts 5C and North holds: AQJ3/A6/KJ976/95. In the Open final, both jumped to 6S, while the Ladies raised to 5S]

Is there something sex-linked about action with the North hand? Both male Norths leaped boldly to slam, ignoring the ugly doubleton, trusting the opponent to save. And Chemla, at Table 1, caught his pigeon, getting the sacrifice [West went to 7C] he expected and collecting 900. However, Szvarc, West at Table 2, was too wily a bird to be panicked into saving unilaterally against a slam he pushed the enemy into. [The slam made]. (No doubt, it is East who should take the save -if he trusts partner more than any partner can be trusted.)

"Knockout in Seattle, III" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 4/1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A voluntarily-bid grand slam goes down four]

Yes, if you are going down in a grand slam it’s better to go down more than one -but there are limits!

Ibid, p. 12

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Declarer had scant prospect of making his contract legitimately (a miraculous doubleton queen in hearts or clubs, he needed), so he concocted a swindle. (...) [The queen was indeed doubleton] As the cards lay, though, the upshot was down two on a game that providence has intended he make.

"Le Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1985, p. 18

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BRAMLEY recovered 7 imps after both teams opened this disgusting 14-count:

K J 7 / Q J / K Q 7 6 5 / Q 10 5

Katz had the grace to be ashamed of the hand, never taking another bid; partner competed to two spades, plus 110. Rodwell, in contrast, was proud of his picture gallery. He freely raised spades, and then accepted a game invitation; down 200 in four spades.

Ibid, p. 20


-------------------------------------------------------------------

[After a relay auction that is not reported]

On the seventh round of bidding, Becker had to choose a contract knowing partner’s exact shape and his high-card content. Three notrump? Yes, but partner’s final reply to a relay had been four spades. So, Becker chose five diamonds. Unluckily, that went minus 50.

Ibid, p. 21

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Becker opens 1H, Rubin responds with a game-forcing relay, 2C]

At table 2, Katz, East, risked an emaciated overcall [2S on K1096/32/J9865/Q3] rather than listen to eleven rounds of relay bidding. That was just as well, since Becker-Rubin would surely have bid the slam if left to their own devices.

Ibid, p. 22

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They had played rather briskly, to no purpose since their opponents all proceeded in the pace of a particularly lazy glacier.

"Le Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1985, p. 5

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The vulberability was favorable, but not the result.

Ibid

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Crane, West, was taught at his mother’s knee that the Lord gives you an ace-king combination to tell you what to lead. (...) But Weichsel, West at Table 1, had learned his bridge 20 years later, after it has been established as gospel that you should lead trumps when your side has all the high cards.

[As it turned out, Crane won an extra doubled undertrick]

Ibid, p. 11

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[North makes a two-suited overcall, South has to play it -for down 1100 as it turns out]

There ought to be a law allowing you to make partner play his own horrors.

"Tribulations" (1985 ITT), TBW 8.1985, p. 15

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[Bergen makes a two-under preempt, 2S for clubs, Cohen passes 2S]

Cohen has seen Bergen’s suits before, and, anyway, this way partner would be declarer for his own disaster.

Ibid, p. 16

-------------------------------------------------------------------

On Ross’s birthday, six diamonds might have been a make, but not this day.

 "Tribulations, II" (1985 ITT), TBW 9.1985, p. 21

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In a way, it is a bonanza for a team to suffer disasters at both tables on the same board. Still, no one can afford many bonanzas like this one.

Ibid, p. 23

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[Kokish overcalls RHO’s 1D with 1H, love all, on:

J6/AKQJ986543/9/-]

... Kokish’s rather sound overcall (I have seen him bid with less)

"Las Vegas Spingold", TBW 10.1985, p. 12

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[At both tables, 3rd-seat player opens on a 4-point, 5-card weak two with disastrous results]

Maybe the players should have accepted the bridge judgment of the ACBL Board of directors, who have proclaimed that one must have 5 high card points for a weak two.

"Las Vegas Spingold, II", TBW 11.1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The five diamonds at Table 1 could have been beaten 300 by a heart lead (...) However, North led ace of diamonds to look at the dummy and what he saw was that he could collect only 100.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Holding a monster, Ira Rubin opens 1C and over partner’s 1H fakes a reverse with 2D on Axx. Partner, Burger, holding five diamonds and three points, passes!]

The official transcript shows no unusual sensory data from Table 1 at the point that Burger passed two diamonds.

Ibid, p. 14

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[North-South reach a good slam on a 5-2 fit, but trumps are 6-0; East holds J108xxx]

 

Another interesting question is whether to double six diamonds with the East hand. The two schools of thought, “Don’t double the only contract you have defense against” versus “Double what’s in front of your nose,” can both use this deal in their propaganda. In fact, had North run to six notrump when doubled in six diamonds, the double might have been disastrous. (…) But in fact no North did run (…) The case for doubling is made best by the result in AMERICA vs. TAIPEI, where both teams reached the inferior slam. There, the nasal school scored a substantial profit for 500 against 150.

 

“Championships in Brazil”, TBW 2/1986, p. 13

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[Same deal as above]

 

The French North-South at Table 8 suffered a disastrous misunderstanding, and then flouted the standard rule for slam-level confusion (when in doubt, play it in notrump).

 

Ibid.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In the Venice Trophy, neither team reached slam, although the Americans at Table 4 did all they could to push the British there.

 

“Championships in Brazil, III”, TBW 4/1986, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

They tried a slam on which, after trumps had split three-two, they needed to pick up a side suit of three small opposite ace-king-ten-fourth without loss. The queen-jack were doubleton, but offside; declarer, playing more accurately than he had bid, led low to the ten –down, 13 imps away.

 

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[West underleads her ace trying to reach partner so as to receive a ruff; East holds KQJxx]

 

underlead in clubs, to the jack (a card guaranteed to give partner momentary heart failure)

 

Ibid, p. 17

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A seemingly laydown grand slam goes two down due to bad breaks]

 

Smith, at Table 4, was not so disgusted at missing what looked like an easy grand slam, when dummy came down, as to get careless in the play.

 

Ibid, p. 19

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[First to speak at game all, South holds: K / A J 10 9 7 6 5 2 / Q 4 / 6 4; the eventual 4H goes down two, with opponents able to make a partial only]

 

It is not unexpected that both players from this side of the Atlantic opened the South hand with four hearts, while both from the other side opened with three. Personally, I would gather up my courage and open with one heart (that singleton king and doubleton queen tell me not to pre-empt), but I doubt if many agree with me. Still, nothing about these results convinces me that I am wrong.

Ibid, p. 21

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Mitchell, South at Table 3, risked that three-spade bid; partner implacably drove all the way to slam, no doubt because of the state of the match (of course, South had already bid the state of the match).

Ibid, p. 22

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

The Austrian decision, at Table 1, to defend three spades doubled is the sort I have never the courage to make. Here, all their aces and kings cashed … so they collected 100. That proved to be an imp better than collecting 50 …

[at another table, the same doubled contract was allowed to make for 9 imps]

Ibid, p. 23

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[West holds 10 3/ 8 6/ 10 8 6/ K J 8 6 4 2]

 

Maybe Berger, West, should have taken out [partner's double of 4H] to five clubs –I wouldn’t prize that hand for defense. Still, Martel, at the other table, doubled five hearts himself –what fatal fascination forces West to defend with those cards?

 

Ibid, p. 27

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Early in the Portland Nationals, this March, I took a taxi to a supermarket to stock my refrigerator against the depredations of partners, partners in law, teammates and guests. My cab driver gave me an enthusiastic greeting, and told me that when the Spring Nationals had last been in Portland, in 1970, he had kibitzed Norman and me through the Vanderbilt. “How did we do” I asked. “You won,” he told me, indignantly. It’s not that I’m blasé about winning Vanderbilts; actually, it’s losing them that I’m accustomed to. I figure that I’ve played in every one since 1946, so this will be my 41st –I have lost 35 times, and counting.

“16 Years Later”, TBW 5/1986, p. 21

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[Second to speak, at none vul., North holds: Q J 9 8 6 5 / 8 4/ J 6 5/ 9 5; partner has a 18-point monster with spade void]

 

In the other match, both Norths were under the impression that they held a weak two-bid. (…) At Table 4, Weinstein, South, simply signed off at a club partial, expecting partner to hold 13 cards of which at least five would be spades.

 

Ibid, p. 28.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Another Stewart-Weinstein preempt (they are disciples of Bergen-Cohen), this one a two-notrump opening showing diamonds, as dealer, vulnerable against not, on

♠ 7 6 4               Q 2              ♦ A Q J 9 7 4               ♣ J 9

backfired. No, it didn’t go for 1400. Partner had the best hand at the table, so it missed a vulnerable game (four hearts) bid by everyone else,

 

Ibid, p. 29-30

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The eighth [board] looked as flat as could be, a lay-down four hearts scoring 420 –but it is the players, not the cards, who make swings. Pavlicek and Weinstein considered this hand,

♠ A J 10 8 4     ♥ Q      ♦ 10 3 2           ♣ Q 9 8 2

to be a weak-two bid, as dealer, no one vulnerable. Both paid 700 for their opinion: 7 imps to ROSS; 7 imps to  WHITAKER.

 

Ibid, p. 32

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Six hearts was not a success, as there was an extra trump loser in addition to the two aces that were unluckily offside: down 200.

“16 Years Later, II”, TBW 6/1986, p. 21

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[Second to speak, at favourable, West holds A K J 9 8 6 2 / K 2 / 7 6 5 3 / ---

South opens 1♣ and both Wests bid 4♠; North bids 5♣ which becomes the final contract, down one for a push]

 

On the following board, the auctions and results were identical at the two tables, and might have been duplicated at almost every table of experts. I may be the only one in America who would raise an objection. But perhaps this deal will convert others. My quarrel, no doubt unreasonable since so few agree, is with West's four-spade bid, a preempt with the best hand at the table, with first-round control of two suits and second-round control of three. Oh, it is not that partner will fail to visualize a slam when he holds, say,

x x x x / x x x x / A / x x x x

The real objection  is that the preempt often has the effect of stampeding North into five-level action that you would rather not hear, when neither you nor partner can possibly know what to do –you have preempted against yourself.

 

“Grand National Teams, 1986”, TBW 9/1986, p. 5

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

You and I can make the grand slam on these cards, but Landen and Whitaker were looking at only two hands. They took the diamond finesse, of course, so down they went [queen was doubleton offside]

 

Toronto Spingold”, TBW 10/1986, p. 17

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

As it so often happens, the undisciplined pre-empt had crowded the opponents into an action (the right one, it turned out) that neither the preemptor nor his partner could possibly know what to do about.

Toronto Spingold, II”, TBW 11/1986, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At game all, West opens 1H, North doubles and East bids 2H on

J8643/1062/1052/K10; this prompts partner to go to 5H, minus 800]

 

When the auction at Table 1 soared into the stratosphere, Brachman, East, doubtless regretted his raise to two, pointless, heartless and spadeful.

 

Ibid, p. 4

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Cohen, East, chose to pass with the East cards, perhaps because he didn’t have an opening bid.

Ibid, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

On this auction, the heart three seemed both safe and attractive. It turned out to be merely attractive.

“Rosenblum Cup, 1986”, TBW 12/1986, p. 6

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It is not entirely clear why Meckstroth, East, chose to double five clubs. He must have wondered why himself, after declarer ruffed the opening diamond lead. [An overtrick was made].

 

Ibid, p. 15

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

The American four-spade contract was doubled, not by East, who had the trumps, but by Zia, who seldom collects multiple undertricks undoubled.

“Rosenblum Cup, II”, TBW 1/1987, p. 14

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Theoretically, I prefer the Pakistani weak-notrump sequence [that stayed at 2NT] to the American Puppet Stayman auction [that bid 3NT] (…) As a practical matter, I greatly prefer plus 600 to plus 180.

Ibid, p. 19

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

However, Stansby, South, didn't have the ace, and he judged from the violent signal that North had it (Meckstroth's opening bids do not promise the wealth of the Indies). So, South, after ruffing the second spade, obediently returned a heart, the four to direct a diamond switch. That was too much obedience, and too little reverence for the setting trick. Declarer pitched his diamonds on dummy's spades –plus 750.

“The ’87 Vanderbilt”, TBW 5/1987, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Stansby, the declarer in six clubs, was born too late to have learned the old adage, “The king of clubs is always singleton in the Vanderbilt.” He took the finesse, relying on cold mathematics –minus 50.

“The ’87 Vanderbilt, II”, TBW 6/1987, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[One table reaches a lay-down 6S, the other 7S with an inescapable loser]

 

The difference in play at the two tables was that Casen cheerfully drew trumps and claimed, conceding a diamond, plus 1430, while Martel grimly played trick after trick, losing his loser at the bitter end, minus 100.

Ibid, p. 12

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 [At some tables East opens 2S on: J 10 7 6 4 3 / J 8 5 / K 7 / J 8]

 

Table 3 had a normal auction to the normal contract, a heart game –anyway, what used to be a normal auction before it became fashionable to open hands like East's.

“Team Trials”, TBW 7/1987, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Bergen, terrified by his own overcall, passed a forcing bid.

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[The opponents preempt vigorously in clubs; Martel holds three cards there, hopes partner is short, raises partner to slam; actually partner has low doubleton]

Berkowitz-Lilie did not have the common decency to hold nine clubs for all their bidding; nor did they have the imagination to avoid a club lead. Stolidly, they cashed their clubs –down 100.

“Team Trials, II”, TBW 8/1987, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

… Martel is a founder member of the Take the Sure Profit Organization.

 

“Grand National Teams”, TBW 9/1987, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East holds cashable AK of clubs against 6D slam]

 

Should East double for a club lead? Surely yes it that's what the double calls for, but does it?

At Table 2, East was on lead. She doubled to remind herself to lead the club king: minus 200, 17 imps to JACOBUS.

 

Baltimore Spingold”, TBW 10/1987, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[South opens 1NT holding AJ9xx in spades; West bids 2♣ Cappeletti, holding hearts; East holds a string of clubs and passes; 2♣ makes with opposition cold for 4♠]

 

It is my general view that anyone who opens one notrump when holding a five-card major, as Silver did at Table 1, deserves anything that happens to him. Still, I do admit that North-South were unlucky. West prepared to show his hearts, North lurked in the bushes, hoping for a fat penalty, and East had no interest whatsoever in letting partner bid his suit (spades, no doubt).

 

Ibid.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 And 10 imps more to MAHAFFEY when Glubok treated,

♠ 9 8 4 3  Q J 10 8 7 3 ♦ 4 ♣ A J

as a weak two-bid in hearts, dealer, both vulnerable. Plus 140, but the six-four spade fit scored 620 at the other table. There are those who consider this sort of results unlucky.

Baltimore Spingold, II”, TBW 11/1987, p. 7

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Rotman-Glubok had a confusion over Roman key-card Kickback or whatever (O for the days when there were but four aces, and four notrump asked about them!)

 

Ibid, p. 8

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

I wonder how many matches could be won simply by passing all penalty doubles and taking out all take-out doubles.

 

Ibid, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East has void in clubs and a tenace in a side suit; West holds eight solid clubs]

 

In Challenge the Champs, the top award would go to a contract of seven clubs played by East (not that anyone except you and me would find a way to get there). In Jamaica, the imps went to those who bid any grand slam, since both key major-suit honors were onside.

 

“Championships in Jamaica”, TBW 1/1988, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Bermuda Bowl and Venice Cup were down to their final matches: 176 boards for the men, 128 for the women. (Some called that sexism. I did hear the view that 176 boards would be too much for the frail sex; and some MCP remarked that it would improve the women's bridge games to sit in the Vu-Graph room and watch the last 48 boards of the Bermuda Bowl.

 

“Championships in Jamaica, II”, TBW 2/1988, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A cold grand slam is played in game]

In the Venice Cup, FRANCE gained an imp when the American declarer chose to make only 12 tricks, perhaps a good idea psychologically. An even better idea would have been for some West to realize that those cards were far from worthless against the sort of hand East was promising.

 

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Partner passes, RHO opens 1♦, you hold: ♠ K ♥ A J 7 ♦ --- ♣ A K Q J 9 8 7 5 4]

 

In the Bermuda Bowl, both players leapt to five clubs directly over one diamond, but that action did not appeal to Deas. She probed delicately with six clubs over one diamond, found partner with the ace of spades plus a trump entry, and scored up 920, 11 imps.

 

“Championships in Jamaica, III”, TBW 3/1988, p. 4

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Apparently, there was confusion over whether the king of diamonds should be counted as an ace on their auction, or only the king of hearts (how much simpler life was back then when there were only four aces instead five or six!). Obviously, the grand slam had no play.

 

Ibid, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East holds ♠ Q 9 6 4  Q 9 4  ♦ A 7 5  ♣ A 6 2]

 

Following the modern fashion, everyone opened the bidding with that limp East hand (this is progress?), but most had little joy from this fashionable decision.

[Opponents reached 4♥, then finessed against opener for the queen despite holding nine trumps]

 

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

The 1988 Spring Nationals were held in Buffalo in the wisdom of the ACBL Board. Most days it snowed, some days it rained, but the bridge was played indoors (in a bleak convention center, but indoors). So, even if the site left something to be desired (it would be nice to believe that someone at the League collected payola, but I doubt it), no great harm was done.

 

“Shuffle off”, TBW 5/1988, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[At favourable, North holds: ♠ 96 ♥ 6 ♦ A 10 7 6 4 ♣ A 8 6 5 4]

 

Both Norths committed the unusual notrump, but only one was punished.

[went for 1100 at 3♣ dbled]

 

Ibid, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The third quarter was rather dull, with a few routine games and a dozen boards on which a partscore was the limit. Either team could have won a substantial number of imps by playing all twelve of them under game, but if that were their attitude towards bidding games they would never have reached the semifinal round.

 

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Kantar holds ♠ A ♥ K Q 9 4 ♦ A J 7 5 ♣ K J 8 4, opens 1♦ and misses hearts]

 

In the old days, Eddie Kantar opened the West hand one heart, and never knew he had a problem. Abandoning his principles cost him 11 imps here.

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Berkowitz holds three spades and four clubs, doubles the opponents' 4♠ bid and they run to 5♣]

Berkowitz, East at Table 1, did not relish the prospect of defending against the four-three spade game when trumps were splitting three-three –how much better to defend five clubs! So, he doubled four spades, rightly figuring that RHO, Andersen, would not allow his sponsor to struggle in a Moysian fit, doubled, against Lord knows what horrible split.

 

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[West holds ♠2 ♥7 5 2 ♦ A K Q 10 5 4 3 ♣10 9, first to speak, nv against v]

The six Wests chose five different actions as dealer: two one-bids, one old-fashioned three-bid, one gambling three notrump, one full-blooded  five-bid, and one courageous pass, courageous because it committed West to act later at whatever level became necessary. Walsh's courage at Table 4 was punished severely: at five diamonds doubled she was held to her seven trump tricks –down four, minus 800.

“Trials of the Memphis Seven”, TBW 7/1988, p. 12

----------------------------------------------------------------

[At 3NT, you hold ♥ K J facing ♥ A 10 8 4 2 and you must pick up the suit]

 

In the women's matches, both declarer who faced this problem (…) played king of hearts, jack of hearts, finessing through North. The two men played the two of hearts to the jack, finessing through South. Of course, the men's play was technically superior, since it would pick up queen-doubleton onside (losing to the far less likely queen-singleton offside). And, of course, it was the women who had guessed right in real life –North held queen-third.

 

Ibid, p. 13

----------------------------------------------------------------

[Holding ♠AK5 ♥10 7 6 5 ♦6 3 2 ♣K Q J, Wolff opens 1♥, gains 8 imps]

 

The four-card major opening (or is that a three-carder?) triumphed because the opponents were cold for four hearts, vulnerable –Wolff's opponents never got into the auction.

Ibid.

 

----------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

 

 [An unusual 2NT bid is taken for natural and passed]

 

Two notrump was accurate, in a sense, since the defenders could take only five heart tricks: plus 120. However, everyone else was in slam, making.

 

“Trials of the Memphis Seven, II”, TBW 8/1988, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[East holds 10 8 / J 9 4 / Q 9 8 6 5 2 / 10 9]

Both Easts opened with a light-hearted (light-diamonded?) three diamonds.

 

Ibid, p. 10

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The diamond combination here is virtually identical to a suit discussed in the June issue from the Vanderbilt final. (…) You might think, then, that all declarers would get the suit right. No, unluckily, not one of them had yet received the June issue.

 

Ibid, p. 12

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

It's always right to raise partner with four-card support, even when it looks wrong

 

 

“Trials of the Memphis Seven, III”, TBW 9/1988, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[They didn't bid a game]

Pincus tried to justify the bidding in the play […] However the defense lost its way, shrewdly perhaps, allowing declarer to score a discouraging overtrick.

Ibid, p. 17

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[None vul, second to speak, West opens 3H on 7 6 / Q 9 7 6 4 3 / 9 7 4 / 8 6]

 

At Table 2, where West had opened with the sort of three-bid that will soon drive experts back to Fishbein…

 

“Trials of the Memphis Seven, V”, TBW 11/1988, p. 19

-------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[At none vul, South deals and passes, West bids 1♠, North holds:

 10 / A 8 6 3 / Q 9 5 4 / A 10 7 2]

 

Boyd’s take-out double, as North at table 3, looks entirely reasonable to me, although no one else risked it. (…) Balancing doubles, like Wolff’s as North at Table 4, are generally viewed as safe and proper, definitely the thing to do, so it was vulgar of Martel to double three clubs. (…) Three down, minus 500, 8 imps.

 

Ibid, p. 24.

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East opens 2♣, game forcing. South at favourable holds: xxxx-xx-J109xxx-x]

 

Dam, South for Denmark in the Open Room, took advantage of the favorable vulnerability to put maximum pressure (and then some) on his opponents. Unfortunately, in the process he had undertaken to win ten tricks, rather more than his cards appeared to warrant. The defense was not impeccable, so declarer was allowed to win three tricks, down only seven, minus 1700 …

“Olympiad in Venice”, TBW 12/1988, p. 8

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------

South took advantage of the favorable vulnerability to give a preemptive jump raise; the vulnerability was favorable for North, too, so he added to the preemption. What could the poor Meckstroth and Rodwell do but double? [They collected 1100]

"Olympiad in Venice, IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[They languish at 3C when 6C is on]

On the auction in the Open Room of the Women’s, playing three clubs as nonforcing (...) has much to be said for it. Of course, whatever is said should be said to partner before the session.

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Declarer plays 7S]

He won the king-of-clubs lead, cashed ace of diamonds (apparently as a sporting gesture, in case an opponent was void.)

 "Olympiad in Venice, IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[After a nonvul. save went for 1100]

"Favorable" vulnerability isn’t all that favorable under the new scoring.

"The 1989 Vanderbilt, II", TBW 8/1989, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Understandably, he was reluctant to bid to the four level, vulnerable, opposite a third-seat opening (partnerships who frequently open light in third position are seldom aware of what it costs them).

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Soloway (...) also stole the contract undoubled, with his gay leap to three notrump. However, merciless defense made the theft expensive.

"A berth for Perth", TBW 9.1989, p. 29

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Pollack-Cohen were the only pair to reach a sensible [slam] contract, with their 12 top tricks, 33 high-card points, four aces and a running suit. Of course, the running suit was not easy to discover since no East was foolish enough to bid his diamonds [over partner’s 2C bid] -everyone knew better than to suggest a jack-fifth suit on a slam auction. Yes, there are those who prefer jack-fifth opposite ace-queen-ten to ace-king-fifth opposite ten doubleton, but they are peasants.

"A berth for Perth, II", TBW 10.1989, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Next, Woolsey made believe that this hand,

10 5 / A J 9 / A K / K 8 6 5 4 2

was an one-notrump opening, ending in three notrump, down 300; Soloway considered that he had an unbalanced hand with long clubs, so he ended in two clubs, plus 100.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In second seat, nobody vulnerable, Goldman opened,

Q 7 6 3 / 10 / Q J 6 / J 8 7 4 2

with one spade (Goldman-Soloway open light systemically when non-vulnerable, so it is not clear whether this was a super-shaded light opening or a rather heavy psych.)

Ibid, p. 13





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