Kaplan Nuggets III: 1985-1989
"The Austrians foolishly doubled a
lay-down slam, for no apparent reason except, perhaps, the a priori
unlikelihood of one side’s taking 12 tricks."
"Knockout in
Seattle" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 2/1985, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Isn’t it strange how little leeway modern
responders give openers, considering what they themselves open?
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On Board 1 of all matches, the North player
picked up, as dealer, neither side vulnerable,
9 5 / K Q 8 7 5 3 2 / Q 7 4 / K
Everyone was no doubt aware of the hand’s
glaring flaws for preemptive action, the weak heart spots, the minor-suit
honors that looked so much better for defense than offense. But this was
the first board -what a chance to push the enemy around, setting the tone for
the whole match! Who could resist such temptation? [Only two of the eight] Partner displayed the usual garbage
K872/10/AJ103/J873
and the result was most often 500 (...) The
opponents, with only 21 HCP and no great fit, might not get above the one level
left to their own devices, just as well since this is about what they could
make.
"Knockout in Seattle,
II" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 3/1985, p. 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Overcall, fit-showing jump
by partner, minimum-showing rebid by advancer, all pass]
What an intelligent way to miss an easy
vulnerable game!
Ibid, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Vul. against Nonvul, South
opens 1S, West preempts 5C and North holds: AQJ3/A6/KJ976/95. In the Open
final, both jumped to 6S, while the Ladies raised to 5S]
Is there something sex-linked about action
with the North hand? Both male Norths leaped boldly to slam, ignoring the ugly
doubleton, trusting the opponent to save. And Chemla, at Table 1, caught his
pigeon, getting the sacrifice [West went to 7C] he expected
and collecting 900. However, Szvarc, West at Table 2, was too wily a bird to be
panicked into saving unilaterally against a slam he pushed the enemy into. [The slam made]. (No doubt, it is East who should take the save -if he
trusts partner more than any partner can be trusted.)
"Knockout in Seattle,
III" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 4/1985, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[A voluntarily-bid grand
slam goes down four]
Yes, if you are going down in a grand slam
it’s better to go down more than one -but there are limits!
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Declarer had scant prospect of making his
contract legitimately (a miraculous doubleton queen in hearts or clubs, he
needed), so he concocted a swindle. (...) [The queen was indeed doubleton] As the cards lay, though, the upshot was down two on
a game that providence has intended he make.
"Le Vanderbilt",
TBW 6/1985, p. 18
-------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAMLEY recovered 7 imps after both teams
opened this disgusting 14-count:
K J 7 / Q J / K Q 7 6 5 / Q 10 5
Katz had the grace to be ashamed of the
hand, never taking another bid; partner competed to two spades, plus 110.
Rodwell, in contrast, was proud of his picture gallery. He freely raised
spades, and then accepted a game invitation; down 200 in four spades.
Ibid, p. 20
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[After a relay auction that
is not reported]
On the seventh round of bidding, Becker had
to choose a contract knowing partner’s exact shape and his high-card content.
Three notrump? Yes, but partner’s final reply to a relay had been four spades.
So, Becker chose five diamonds. Unluckily, that went minus 50.
Ibid, p. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Becker opens 1H, Rubin
responds with a game-forcing relay, 2C]
At table 2, Katz, East, risked an emaciated
overcall [2S on
K1096/32/J9865/Q3] rather than listen to
eleven rounds of relay bidding. That was just as well, since Becker-Rubin would
surely have bid the slam if left to their own devices.
Ibid, p. 22
-------------------------------------------------------------------
They had played rather briskly, to no purpose since their opponents all
proceeded in the pace of a particularly lazy glacier.
"Le Vanderbilt,
II", TBW 7/1985, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The vulberability was favorable, but not the
result.
Ibid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Crane, West, was taught at his mother’s knee
that the Lord gives you an ace-king combination to tell you what to lead. (...)
But Weichsel, West at Table 1, had learned his bridge 20 years later, after it
has been established as gospel that you should lead trumps when your side has
all the high cards.
[As it turned out, Crane won
an extra doubled undertrick]
Ibid, p. 11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[North makes a two-suited
overcall, South has to play it -for down 1100 as it turns out]
There ought to be a law allowing you to make
partner play his own horrors.
"Tribulations"
(1985 ITT), TBW 8.1985, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Bergen makes a two-under
preempt, 2S for clubs, Cohen passes 2S]
Cohen has seen Bergen’s suits before, and,
anyway, this way partner would be declarer for his own disaster.
Ibid, p. 16
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On Ross’s birthday, six diamonds might have
been a make, but not this day.
"Tribulations,
II" (1985 ITT), TBW 9.1985, p. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In a way, it is a bonanza for a team to
suffer disasters at both tables on the same board. Still, no one can afford
many bonanzas like this one.
Ibid, p. 23
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Kokish overcalls RHO’s 1D
with 1H, love all, on:
J6/AKQJ986543/9/-]
... Kokish’s rather sound overcall (I have
seen him bid with less)
"Las Vegas
Spingold", TBW 10.1985, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At both tables, 3rd-seat
player opens on a 4-point, 5-card weak two with disastrous results]
Maybe the players should have accepted the
bridge judgment of the ACBL Board of directors, who have proclaimed that one
must have 5 high card points for a weak two.
"Las Vegas Spingold,
II", TBW 11.1985, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The five diamonds at Table 1 could have been
beaten 300 by a heart lead (...) However, North led ace of diamonds to look at
the dummy and what he saw was that he could collect only 100.
Ibid, p. 11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Holding a monster, Ira
Rubin opens 1C and over partner’s 1H fakes a reverse with 2D on Axx. Partner,
Burger, holding five diamonds and three points, passes!]
The official transcript shows no unusual
sensory data from Table 1 at the point that Burger passed two diamonds.
Ibid, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[North-South
reach a good slam on a 5-2 fit, but trumps are 6-0;
East holds J108xxx]
Another
interesting question is whether to double six diamonds with the East hand. The
two schools of thought, “Don’t
double the only contract you have defense against” versus “Double what’s in
front of your nose,” can both use this deal in their propaganda. In fact, had North run to six notrump when doubled in six diamonds, the
double might have been disastrous. (…) But in fact no North did run (…) The case for doubling is made best by the result in
“Championships
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Same deal
as above]
The French
North-South at Table 8 suffered a disastrous misunderstanding, and then flouted
the standard rule for slam-level confusion (when in doubt, play it in notrump).
Ibid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the
Venice Trophy, neither team reached slam, although the Americans at Table 4 did
all they could to push the British there.
“Championships
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
They tried
a slam on which, after trumps had split three-two, they needed to pick up a
side suit of three small opposite ace-king-ten-fourth without loss. The
queen-jack were doubleton, but offside; declarer, playing more accurately than
he had bid, led low to the ten –down, 13 imps away.
Ibid, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[West
underleads her ace trying to reach partner so as to receive a ruff; East holds
KQJxx]
… underlead in clubs, to the jack (a card guaranteed to give
partner momentary heart failure)
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[A
seemingly laydown grand slam goes two down due to bad breaks]
Smith, at
Table 4, was not so disgusted at missing what looked like an easy grand slam,
when dummy came down, as to get careless in the play.
Ibid, p. 19
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[First to
speak at game all, South holds: K / A J 10 9 7 6 5 2 / Q 4 / 6 4; the eventual
4H goes down two, with opponents able to make a partial only]
It is not
unexpected that both players from this side of the
Ibid, p. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mitchell,
South at Table 3, risked that three-spade bid; partner implacably drove all the
way to slam, no doubt because of the state of the match (of course, South had
already bid the state of the match).
Ibid, p. 22
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The
Austrian decision, at Table 1, to defend three spades doubled is the sort I
have never the courage to make. Here, all their aces and kings cashed … so they
collected 100. That proved to be an imp better than collecting 50 …
[at another table, the same doubled contract was allowed to
make for 9 imps]
Ibid, p. 23
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[West holds
10 3/ 8 6/ 10 8 6/ K J 8 6 4 2]
Maybe
Berger, West, should have taken out [partner's double of 4H] to five clubs –I
wouldn’t prize that hand for defense. Still, Martel, at the other table,
doubled five hearts himself –what fatal fascination forces West
to defend with those cards?
Ibid, p. 27
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Early in
the Portland Nationals, this March, I took a taxi to a supermarket to stock my
refrigerator against the depredations of partners, partners in law, teammates
and guests. My cab driver gave me an enthusiastic greeting, and told me that
when the Spring Nationals had last been in
“16 Years
Later”, TBW 5/1986, p. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Second to
speak, at none vul., North holds: Q J 9 8 6 5 / 8 4/ J
6 5/ 9 5; partner has a 18-point monster with spade void]
In the
other match, both Norths were under the impression that they held a weak
two-bid. (…) At Table 4, Weinstein, South, simply signed off at a club partial,
expecting partner to hold 13 cards of which at least five would be spades.
Ibid, p. 28.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Another
Stewart-Weinstein preempt (they are disciples of Bergen-Cohen), this one a
two-notrump opening showing diamonds,
as dealer, vulnerable against not, on
♠ 7 6
4 ♥ Q 2 ♦
A Q J 9 7 4 ♣ J 9
backfired.
No, it didn’t go for 1400. Partner had the best hand at the table, so it missed
a vulnerable game (four hearts) bid by everyone else,
Ibid, p.
29-30
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The eighth
[board] looked as flat as could be, a lay-down four hearts scoring 420 –but it
is the players, not the cards, who make swings. Pavlicek and Weinstein
considered this hand,
♠ A J
10 8 4 ♥ Q ♦ 10 3 2 ♣ Q 9 8 2
to be a
weak-two bid, as dealer, no one vulnerable. Both paid 700 for their opinion: 7
imps to ROSS; 7 imps to WHITAKER.
Ibid, p. 32
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Six hearts
was not a success, as there was an extra trump loser in addition to the two
aces that were unluckily offside: down 200.
“16 Years
Later, II”, TBW 6/1986, p. 21
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Second to
speak, at favourable, West holds A K J 9 8 6 2 / K 2 / 7 6 5 3 / ---
South opens
1♣ and both Wests bid 4♠; North bids 5♣ which becomes the
final contract, down one for a push]
On the
following board, the auctions and results were identical at the two tables, and
might have been duplicated at almost every table of experts. I may be the only
one in
x x x x / x
x x x / A / x x x x
The real
objection is that the preempt often has
the effect of stampeding North into five-level action that you would rather not
hear, when neither you nor partner can possibly know what to do –you have
preempted against yourself.
“Grand
National Teams, 1986”, TBW 9/1986, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
You and I
can make the grand slam on these cards, but Landen and Whitaker were looking at
only two hands. They took the diamond finesse, of course, so down they went
[queen was doubleton offside]
“
-------------------------------------------------------------------
As it so
often happens, the undisciplined pre-empt had crowded the opponents into an
action (the right one, it turned out) that neither the preemptor nor his
partner could possibly know what to do about.
“
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At game
all, West opens 1H, North doubles and East bids 2H on
J8643/1062/1052/K10;
this prompts partner to go to 5H, minus 800]
When the
auction at Table 1 soared into the stratosphere, Brachman, East, doubtless
regretted his raise to two, pointless, heartless and spadeful.
Ibid, p. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Cohen, East, chose to pass with the East cards, perhaps because he
didn’t have an opening bid.
Ibid, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On this
auction, the heart three seemed both safe and attractive. It turned out to be
merely attractive.
“Rosenblum
Cup, 1986”, TBW 12/1986, p. 6
-------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not
entirely clear why Meckstroth, East, chose to double five clubs. He must have
wondered why himself, after declarer ruffed the opening diamond lead. [An
overtrick was made].
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The
American four-spade contract was doubled, not by East, who had the trumps, but
by Zia, who seldom collects multiple undertricks undoubled.
“Rosenblum
Cup, II”, TBW 1/1987, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Theoretically,
I prefer the Pakistani weak-notrump sequence [that stayed at 2NT] to the
American Puppet Stayman auction [that bid 3NT] (…) As
a practical matter, I greatly prefer plus
600 to plus 180.
Ibid, p. 19
-------------------------------------------------------------------
However,
Stansby, South, didn't have the ace, and he judged from the violent signal that
North had it (Meckstroth's opening
bids do not promise the wealth of the
“The ’87
Vanderbilt”, TBW 5/1987, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Stansby,
the declarer in six clubs, was born too late to have learned the old adage,
“The king of clubs is always singleton in the Vanderbilt.” He took the finesse,
relying on cold mathematics –minus 50.
“The ’87
Vanderbilt, II”, TBW 6/1987, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[One table
reaches a lay-down 6S, the other 7S with an inescapable loser]
The difference
in play at the two tables was that Casen cheerfully drew trumps and claimed,
conceding a diamond, plus 1430, while Martel grimly played trick after trick,
losing his loser at the bitter end, minus 100.
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At some tables East opens 2S on: J 10 7 6 4 3 /
J 8 5 / K 7 / J 8]
Table 3 had
a normal auction to the normal contract, a heart game –anyway, what used to be a normal auction before it
became fashionable to open hands like East's.
“Team
Trials”, TBW 7/1987, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Ibid, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[The
opponents preempt vigorously in clubs; Martel holds three cards there, hopes
partner is short, raises partner to slam; actually partner has low doubleton]
Berkowitz-Lilie
did not have the common decency to hold nine clubs for all their bidding; nor did
they have the imagination to avoid a club lead. Stolidly, they cashed their
clubs –down 100.
“Team
Trials, II”, TBW 8/1987, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
… Martel is
a founder member of the Take the Sure Profit Organization.
“Grand
National Teams”, TBW 9/1987, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East holds
cashable AK of clubs against 6D slam]
Should East
double for a club lead? Surely yes it that's what the double calls for, but
does it?
At Table 2,
East was on lead. She doubled to remind herself to lead the club king: minus
200, 17 imps to JACOBUS.
“
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[South
opens 1NT holding AJ9xx in spades; West bids 2♣ Cappeletti, holding
hearts; East holds a string of clubs and passes;
2♣ makes with opposition cold for 4♠]
It is my
general view that anyone who opens one notrump when holding a five-card major,
as Silver did at Table 1, deserves anything that happens to him. Still, I do
admit that North-South were unlucky. West prepared to show his hearts, North
lurked in the bushes, hoping for a fat penalty, and East had no interest
whatsoever in letting partner bid his suit (spades, no doubt).
Ibid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
And 10 imps more to MAHAFFEY when Glubok
treated,
♠ 9 8
4 3 ♥ Q J
10 8 7 3 ♦ 4 ♣ A J
as a weak
two-bid in hearts, dealer, both vulnerable. Plus 140, but the six-four spade
fit scored 620 at the other table. There are those who consider this sort of
results unlucky.
“
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rotman-Glubok
had a confusion over Roman key-card Kickback or
whatever (O for the days when there were but four aces, and four notrump asked
about them!)
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
I wonder
how many matches could be won simply by passing all penalty doubles and taking
out all take-out doubles.
Ibid, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East has void in clubs and a tenace in a side suit; West holds
eight solid clubs]
In
Challenge the Champs, the top award would go to a contract of seven clubs
played by East (not that anyone except you and me
would find a way to get there). In
“Championships
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bermuda
Bowl and Venice Cup were down to their final matches: 176 boards for the men,
128 for the women. (Some called that sexism. I did hear the view that 176
boards would be too much for the frail sex; and some MCP remarked that it would
improve the women's bridge games to sit in the Vu-Graph room and watch the last
48 boards of the Bermuda Bowl.
“Championships
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[A cold
grand slam is played in game]
In the
Venice Cup,
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Partner
passes,
In the
Bermuda Bowl, both players leapt to five clubs directly over one diamond, but
that action did not appeal to Deas. She probed delicately with six clubs over one diamond, found
partner with the ace of spades plus a trump entry, and scored up 920, 11 imps.
“Championships
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Apparently,
there was confusion over whether the king of diamonds should be counted as an ace on their auction, or only the
king of hearts (how much simpler life
was back then when there were only four aces instead five or six!). Obviously,
the grand slam had no play.
Ibid, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East holds
♠ Q 9 6 4 ♥
Q 9 4 ♦ A 7 5 ♣ A 6 2]
Following
the modern fashion, everyone opened the bidding with that limp East hand (this
is progress?), but most had little joy from this fashionable decision.
[Opponents
reached 4♥, then finessed against opener for the queen despite holding
nine trumps]
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1988
Spring Nationals were held in
“Shuffle
off”, TBW 5/1988, p. 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At
favourable, North holds: ♠ 96 ♥ 6 ♦ A 10 7 6 4 ♣ A 8 6
5 4]
Both Norths
committed the unusual notrump, but only one was punished.
[went for 1100 at 3♣ dbled]
Ibid, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The third
quarter was rather dull, with a few routine games and a dozen boards on which a
partscore was the limit. Either team could have won a substantial number of imps
by playing all twelve of them under game, but if that were their attitude
towards bidding games they would never have reached the semifinal round.
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Kantar
holds ♠ A ♥ K Q 9 4 ♦ A J 7 5 ♣ K J 8 4, opens 1♦
and misses hearts]
In the old
days, Eddie Kantar opened the West hand one heart, and never knew he had a
problem. Abandoning his principles cost him 11 imps here.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Berkowitz
holds three spades and four clubs, doubles the opponents' 4♠ bid and they
run to 5♣]
Berkowitz,
East at Table 1, did not relish the prospect of defending against the
four-three spade game when trumps were splitting three-three –how much better
to defend five clubs! So, he doubled four spades, rightly figuring that
Ibid, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[West holds
♠2 ♥7 5 2 ♦ A K Q 10 5 4 3 ♣10 9, first to speak, nv against v]
The six
Wests chose five different actions as dealer: two one-bids, one old-fashioned
three-bid, one gambling three notrump, one full-blooded five-bid, and one courageous pass,
courageous because it committed West to act later at whatever level became
necessary. Walsh's courage at Table 4 was punished severely: at five diamonds
doubled she was held to her seven trump tricks –down four, minus 800.
“Trials of
the
----------------------------------------------------------------
[At 3NT,
you hold ♥ K J facing ♥ A 10 8 4 2 and you must pick up the suit]
In the
women's matches, both declarer who faced this problem (…) played king of
hearts, jack of hearts, finessing through North. The two men played the two of
hearts to the jack, finessing through South. Of course, the men's play was
technically superior, since it would pick up queen-doubleton onside (losing to
the far less likely queen-singleton offside). And, of course, it was the women
who had guessed right in real life –North held queen-third.
Ibid, p. 13
----------------------------------------------------------------
[Holding ♠AK5
♥10 7 6 5 ♦6 3 2 ♣K Q J, Wolff opens 1♥, gains 8 imps]
The
four-card major opening (or is that a three-carder?) triumphed because the
opponents were cold for four hearts, vulnerable –Wolff's opponents never got
into the auction.
Ibid.
----------------------------------------------------------------
[An unusual 2NT bid is taken for natural and
passed]
Two notrump
was accurate, in a sense, since the defenders could take only five heart
tricks: plus 120. However, everyone else was in slam, making.
“Trials of
the
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East holds
10 8 / J 9 4 / Q 9 8 6 5 2 / 10 9]
Both Easts
opened with a light-hearted (light-diamonded?) three diamonds.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The diamond
combination here is virtually identical to a suit discussed in the June issue
from the Vanderbilt final. (…) You might think, then, that all declarers would
get the suit right. No, unluckily, not one of them had yet received the June
issue.
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
It's always
right to raise partner with four-card support, even when it looks wrong
“Trials of
the
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[They
didn't bid a game]
Pincus
tried to justify the bidding in the play […] However
the defense lost its way, shrewdly perhaps, allowing declarer to score a
discouraging overtrick.
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[None vul,
second to speak, West opens 3H on 7 6 / Q 9 7 6 4 3 / 9 7 4 / 8 6]
At Table 2,
where West had opened with the sort of three-bid that will soon drive experts
back to Fishbein…
“Trials of
the
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At none
vul, South deals and passes, West bids 1♠, North
holds:
10 / A 8 6 3 / Q 9 5 4 / A 10 7 2]
Boyd’s
take-out double, as North at table 3, looks entirely reasonable to me, although
no one else risked it. (…) Balancing
doubles, like Wolff’s as North at Table 4, are generally viewed as safe and
proper, definitely the thing to do, so it was vulgar of Martel to double three
clubs. (…) Three down, minus 500, 8 imps.
Ibid, p. 24.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East opens
2♣, game forcing. South at favourable holds: xxxx-xx-J109xxx-x]
Dam, South
for
“Olympiad
in
-------------------------------------------------------------------
South took advantage of the favorable
vulnerability to give a preemptive jump raise; the vulnerability was favorable
for North, too, so he added to the preemption. What could the poor Meckstroth
and Rodwell do but double? [They collected 1100]
"Olympiad in Venice,
IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[They languish at 3C when
6C is on]
On the auction in the Open Room of the
Women’s, playing three clubs as nonforcing (...) has much to be said for it. Of
course, whatever is said should be said to partner before the session.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Declarer plays 7S]
He won the king-of-clubs lead, cashed ace of
diamonds (apparently as a sporting gesture, in case an opponent was void.)
"Olympiad in
Venice, IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[After a nonvul. save went
for 1100]
"Favorable" vulnerability isn’t
all that favorable under the new scoring.
"The 1989 Vanderbilt,
II", TBW 8/1989, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Understandably, he was reluctant to bid to
the four level, vulnerable, opposite a third-seat opening (partnerships who
frequently open light in third position are seldom aware of what it costs
them).
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Soloway (...) also stole the contract
undoubled, with his gay leap to three notrump. However, merciless defense made
the theft expensive.
"A berth for
Perth", TBW 9.1989, p. 29
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Pollack-Cohen were the only pair to reach a
sensible [slam] contract, with their 12 top tricks, 33 high-card points, four
aces and a running suit. Of course, the running suit was not easy to discover
since no East was foolish enough to bid his diamonds [over partner’s 2C bid]
-everyone knew better than to suggest a jack-fifth suit on a slam auction. Yes,
there are those who prefer jack-fifth opposite ace-queen-ten to ace-king-fifth
opposite ten doubleton, but they are peasants.
"A berth for Perth,
II", TBW 10.1989, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, Woolsey made believe that this hand,
10 5 / A J 9 / A K / K 8 6 5 4 2
was an one-notrump opening, ending in three
notrump, down 300; Soloway considered that he had an unbalanced hand with long
clubs, so he ended in two clubs, plus 100.
Ibid, p. 11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In second seat, nobody vulnerable, Goldman
opened,
Q 7 6 3 / 10 / Q J 6 / J 8 7 4 2
with one spade (Goldman-Soloway open light
systemically when non-vulnerable, so it is not clear whether this was a
super-shaded light opening or a rather heavy psych.)
Ibid, p. 13
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